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Abstract
Natural resource dependence is believed to have potential impact on institutional devel-
opment, and there is growing consensus in the academic literature that institutional weakness
is central to the explanation of the negative e¤ects of resource booms. Generally, the quality
of institutional framework and natural resource dependence interact mutually. Natural re-
sources rents can damage institutions by removing incentives to conduct reforms and even to
establish a well-functioning bureaucracy. Also, weak institutional quality is the ultimate cause
for a disadvantageous management framework of natural resources and process of convert-
ing revenue ows into economic development. This paper examines the connection between
institutional quality and resource dependence in resource-rich Caspian Basin countries (Azer-
baijan, Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan) with transition economies. The analysis for the
total natural resources rents suggests that, in aggregate, revenues on total natural resources
have a negative impact on government e¤ectiveness.
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1 Introduction
The role of institutional quality in the resource cursecountries
Due to the assessment of international nancial institutions, in the past decades, natural resources
played a crucial role in the economic development of many resource-rich countries. Until the 1980s,
natural resource abundance was considered an advantage by economists. However, theoretical and
empirical research starting in the 1980s reached conclusions to the contrary, suggesting that natural
resources might be an economic curse rather than a blessing. The phrase resource cursewas
coined and, perhaps because of its paradoxical connotation, caught on in both academic and policy
circles. The current literature distinguishes between no less than three di¤erent dimensionsof
the resource curse: resources are associated with slower economic growth, violent civil conict,
and undemocratic regime types(Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008).1 Various studies suggest that
resource dependent countries have, on average, lower long-run growth rates than countries with a
more diversied export structure. It is possible that resource dependence may impact institutional
development, which can determine a countrys growth potential following resource booms. At the
same time there is growing consensus in the academic literature that institutional weakness is
central to the explanation of the negative e¤ects of resource booms (Collier and Hoe­ er, 2009). In
this regard, the existing literature distinguishes formal and informal institutions. With respect to
natural resources, formal institutions could include legislation on the natural resource sectors or
a scal equalization formula for transfers from resource-rich provinces to those that are resource-
poor. But informal institutions encompass the unwritten rules structuring behavior.
Regarding Douglas Norths eminent denition, institutions are the humanly devised con-
straints that structure political, economic and social interaction(North, 1991). Also, "institutions
might be dened as a set of social factors, rules, beliefs, values and organizations that jointly moti-
vate regularity in individual and social behavior" (see Alonso and Garcimartín, 2009; Greif, 2006).
Institutions are the rules of the gamethat structure political, economic, and social interactions.
"Why Nations Fail" by Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2012) focuses on the process
of institutional drift that produce political and economic institutions that can be either inclusive
- focused on power-sharing, productivity, education, technological advances and the well-being of
the nation as a whole; or extractive - bent on grabbing wealth and resources away from one part
of society to benet another(Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012).2
Generally, quality of institutional framework and natural resource dependence interact mutu-
ally. On the one hand, natural resources rents can damage governance institutions by removing
incentives to reform and even to establish a well-functioning bureaucracy (Hartford and Klein,
1On economic growth, refer to Sachs and Warner (1997), Mehlum et al. (2005). On conict, refer to Collier and
Hoe­ er (1998), Collier et al. (2007), Ross (2004a,b), Lujala (2005). On regime type and institutions more broadly,
refer to Leite and Weidmann (2002), Jensen and Wantchekon (2004).
2http://www.rand.org/blog/2012/04/book-review-why-nations-fail-by-daron-acemoglu-and.html
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2005). On the other hand, weaker institutional quality is cause for an objectionable management
framework of natural resources and process of converting revenue ows into sustainable develop-
ment. Based on these assumptions, we can assert that it is relatively complicated to identify a
cause-e¤ect relationship between institutional quality and oil-gas revenue ows in resource de-
pendent countries. Natural resource-rich post-Soviet countries (Azerbaijan, Russia, Kazakhstan,
and Turkmenistan) share a common historical legacy and had a very similar weak institutional
and regulatory framework in both the political and the economic sphere before their resource booms
(1991-2001). This paper examines the impact of oil-gas revenue ows on quality of institutions
during and after resource booms (2001-2011).
Barma, Kaiser, Le and Viñuela (2012) emphasize that the quality of a countrys institutions is
central in the resource paradox and institutional quality tends to vary along with levels of economic
development. They state that a simple empirical fact often ascribed as a major dimension of
the resource curse is that resource-dependent countries are endowed with poorer institutional
quality than they should have, given their income levels. Holding gross domestic product (GDP)
constant, resource-dependent countries perform less well in governance indicators demonstrating
the institutional dimension of the resource curse(Barma, Kaiser, Le, and Viñuela, 2012). Relevant
"policies could be e¤ective in leveraging natural resource-led development only when they are
compatible with the level of institutional quality and the political economy context of the country
in question" (Barma, Kaiser, Le, and Viñuela, 2012). Authors preferred to use the Voice and
Accountabilityindicator from the Worldwide Governance Indicators dataset.
Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2006) argue that quality of institutions determines whether
countries avoid the resource curse or not: the combination of grabber friendly institutions and
resource abundance leads to low growth; however, producer friendly institutions help countries to
take full advantage of their natural resources.Authors use the rule of law as a common measure of
institutional quality conrming the evidence that a dangerous mix of weak institutions and resource
abundance causes the resource curse. Their main focus in the theoretical part of the study is the
allocation of entrepreneurs between production and unproductive rent extractiongrabbingwhich
the harms economy. Depending on the quality of institutions, lootable resources may or may not
induce entrepreneurs to specialize in grabbing. In their applied model the institutional quality
is captured by the parameter, which reects the degree to which the institutions favor grabbers
versus producers (see Mehlum, Moene and Torvik, 2006).
Ross (2012) explains that government institutions are themselves damaged by oil revenues.
So, if oil makes government less e¤ective, it could impair their ability to maintain countercyclical
policies. He distinguishes two ways this could occur. First, revenue volatility could shorten the
government planning horizon, which would subvert major investment projects. The second way is
a syndrome called bureaucratic overstretch,meaning that a governments revenues expand more
quickly than its capacity to e¢ ciently manage them. Ross argues that resource-rich countries
sometimes receive windfalls that overwhelm their bureaucratic capacity, amplifying the danger that
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they will be poorly used.He described the tendency that rent seizingoccurs when politicians
sweep aside institutional constraints to gain control of how a valuable resource is allocated and
regulated giving them the power to use it for patronage or corruption. Ross states that many
scholars make a more ambitious claim that petroleum wealth leads to bad institutions,making
governments weaker, more corrupt, less competent and less able to maintain wise scal policies.
Ross claims in his recent study that there is little prima facie evidence that oil revenues tend to
hurt government qualityand if extracting oil were bad for government institutions, it should be
seen a negative correlation between a countrys oil income and the quality of its government(Ross,
2012). Regarding his calculations, government e¤ectiveness declined in the oil states more than in
non-oil states from 1996 to 2006, but di¤erences were not statistically signicant. He put forward a
sound hypothesis that social scientists lack measures of a governments actual performanceand
they often rely on measures of a governments perceived performance.World Bank has already
developed a unique conceptual tool in order to measure governance and institutional framework
entitled World Governance Indicatorswhere authors Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010)
rst portrayed the existing notions of governance and then dened the new denition of governance
as the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised including:
(a) The process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced;
(b) The capacity of the government to e¤ectively formulate and implement sound policies;
(c) The respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social
interactions among them.
The authors have marked two measures of governance corresponding to each of these three
areas (six dimensions of governance):
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GOVERNANCE AREAS INDICATORS
(a) The process by which
governments are selected,
monitored, and replaced:
1. Voice and Accountability (VA)  capturing percep-
tions of the extent to which a countrys citizens are able
to participate in selecting their government, as well as
freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free
media.
2. Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism
(PV) capturing perceptions of the likelihood that the
government will be destabilized or overthrown by un-
constitutional or violent means, including politically-
motivated violence and terrorism.
(b) The capacity of the
government to e¤ectively
formulate and implement
sound policies:
3. Government E¤ectiveness (GE) capturing percep-
tions of the quality of public services, the quality of the
civil service and the degree of its independence from po-
litical pressures, the quality of policy formulation and
implementation, and the credibility of the governments
commitment to such policies.
4. Regulatory Quality (RQ) capturing perceptions of
the ability of the government to formulate and implement
sound policies and regulations that permit and promote
private sector development.
(c) The respect of citizens
and the state for the in-
stitutions that govern eco-
nomic and social interac-
tions among them:
5. Rule of Law (RL) capturing perceptions of the ex-
tent to which agents have condence in and abide by the
rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts,
as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.
6. Control of Corruption (CC) capturing perceptions of
the extent to which public power is exercised for private
gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption,
as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private
interests.
Also, institutional quality can be measured using the Economic Freedom of the World index
published by Gwartney and Lawson (2003). The EFW index has been used in a number of rel-
evant studies. The EFW index measures institutional quality in ve major areas: (1) size of
government; (2) legal structure and security of property rights; (3) access to sound money; (4)
5
exchange with foreigners; (5) regulation of capital, labor, and business (see Gwartney, Holcombe
and Lawson, 2004). Zhuang, Dios, and Lagman-Martin (2010) argue that the concept of quality
of governance institutions is multidimensional and it is possible that certain aspects of institu-
tional quality are more relevant or critical than others in determining economic performance for
specic countries during specic periods. Institutions and their implied governance results may
well be supply-side factors that drive economic growth; they are also attendant products of
growth itself - partly because rising incomes and education levels create a demand for them
(Zhuang, Dios and Lagman-Martin, 2010). Qian (2012) revealed that countries default more often
when they lack rules and strong institutions to curb the inuence of powerful groups on govern-
ment policies. That is because in a polarized government, each powerful group makes decisions
without considering the impact on other groups (see Qian, 2012). Alonso and Garcimartin (2004)
analyzed the four characteristics which dene institutional quality: static e¢ ciency, dynamic ef-
ciency, credibility and predictability. Also, they investigated the determinants of institutional
quality and the determinants under analysis were separated into two groups (rst, "historical"
features of countries: colonial origin, geographic location or legal tradition; second, characteristics
of institutional quality). Their empirical research suggests that the quality of institutions depends
essentially on development level, income distribution, tax revenue and education (see Alonso and
Garcimartin, 2009). They argued that variables, such as natural resource endowments, impact in-
stitutional quality indirectly by a¤ecting income distribution and decreasing tax revenue. Mehrara,
Alhosseini, and Bahramirad (2011) found that oil, as one the most important natural resources,
constitutes a major source of income for many countries, and depending on the institutions of the
country, can contribute to the long term economic growth of that country or lead to the poor long
run economic performance.They suggest to the international donor organizations that solutions
o¤ered for di¤erent countries for the control and prevention of the oil e¤ects on economy should
be diverse depending on the institutions of that country.Their study considered the growth rate
of oil prices in recent years and the probability of negative e¤ects for these revenues on countries
with the worst institutional quality. They distinguish two solutions among the proposals o¤ered
on direct distribution of resource revenues among people and privatization of the oil resources to
countries with the worst institutional quality (Mehrara, Alhosseini, and Bahramirad, 2011). De
Rosa and Iootty (2012) examine in their paper whether natural resource dependence has a negative
inuence on various indicators of institutional quality when controlling for the potential e¤ects of
other geographic, economic and cultural initial conditions (Rosa and Iootty, 2012). They analyzed
a panel of countries from 1996 to 2010 and indicated that a high degree of resource dependence,
measured as the share of mineral fuel exports in a countrys total exports, is associated with worse
government e¤ectiveness, as well as with reduced levels of competition across the economy.
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Resource dependence vs. government e¤ectiveness (De Rosa and Iootty, 2012)
Estimation of short and long run elasticity suggest that government e¤ectiveness and
the intensity of domestic competition decrease over time as the dependence on natural
resources gradu ally increases. The e¤ect seems quite relevant, with a 1% increase in
the average worldwide share of fuel exports in total exports leading to a 0.13% decrease
in government e¤ectiveness in the short run, and to a 0.20% decline in the long run.
When considering competition in the local market, an increase of 1% in the share of
fuel exports in total exports is associated with a decrease of 0.69% in the competition
indicator in the short run and of 0.93% in the long run. The e¤ect in the case of Russia
for government e¤ectiveness appears smaller than the global average but much larger than
in a comparator economy such as Canada. A 1% increase in the share of fuel exports in
total exports of the country would lead to a 0.15% decrease in government e¤ectiveness
in the short run, and to a 0.17% reduction in the long run. This compares to a decrease
in Canada of 0.07% in the short run and 0.08% in the long run.
In current framework provided by De Rosa and Iootty (2012), the rst indicator of institu-
tional quality was based on the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) compiled by the World
Bank. As mentioned before, these indicators emphasize di¤erent aspects of governance (voice
and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government e¤ectiveness, regulatory
quality, rule of law, and control of corruption). The second indicator of institutional quality cap-
tured the indirect e¤ect of resource dependence in terms of undermining a level playing eld in the
economy. The authors preferred to use the index of competition in local markets from the Global
Competitiveness Index (GCI) compiled by the World Economic Forum.
Cherif and Hasanov (2012) developed a model for optimal consumption, saving and investment
policies of oil exporters. But many determinants of growth, development and an e¤ective allocation
of resources are not explicitly specied in their model. These include quality of institutions, edu-
cational attainment, innovation, and economic diversication. They concluded that an increase
in the productivity parameter proxying for better institutions and education would contribute
to higher growth in model (Cherif and Hasanov, 2012). Arezki, Hamilton and Kazimov (2011)
examined the performance of commodity-exporting countries in terms of macroeconomic stability
and growth in a panel of up to 129 countries during the period 1970-2007. They found that on
average government spending in commodity-exporting countries has been pro-cyclical which also
can be considered a result of non-relevant policy-making and institutional arrangements. Finally,
the e¤ects of resource windfalls on macroeconomic stability and economic growth are moderated
by the quality of political institutions(Arezki, Hamilton and Kazimov, 2012). This aspect has
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recently been the subject of extensive study by various scholars (see Heinrich, 2012).
The case of resource-rich Caspian basin countries
The Post-Soviet aspect of the interaction of resource revenues and institutional quality has been
relatively less investigated. There is a very small number of works written by researchers from
these countries. The main reason for this lack is the comparatively short period of existence (a bit
more than 20 years) of post-Soviet countries as opposed to other resource-rich countries. When
the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, it generated not only fteen newly independent states, but
also a new set of petroleum-rich developing countries  Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, The Russian
Federation, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Alongside their petroleum-poor counterparts, these
ve former Soviet Republics inherited universally weak institutions most notably scal regimes.
Their experience suggests not only that weak institutions are not endogenous to mineral but also
that even those mineral-rich states that do not inherit strong institutions can nonetheless build
them (Luong and Weinthal, 2010, p.4). A new system of institutions, which in many ways
ought to be re-established, is springing up in the period of transformation. During the market
reforms of the 1990s, post-Soviet countries not only experienced transformation recession, but also
encountered problems of building new institutions against the background of a decline in state
capacity that a¤ected the processes of state building.3 The Soviet past of these countries not only
served as a counterproductive basis for the establishment of e¢ cient institutions, but in many ways
was the catalyst of rent-seeking behavior of political and economic actors who shared the former
Soviet assets between them.4 Unsurprisingly, post - Soviet institution building led to a partial and
low-level equilibrium of the rules of the game (Gelman and Marganiya, 2010).5
Although the assessments of the transformation works in that period are discrepant, many
authors nevertheless admit that the foundation of a new institutional system of post-Soviet space
was laid in that specic period, particularly in Russia. The rst period came during the 1990s
and can rightfully be called a period of transformation. It was marked, rst and foremost, by large-
scale institutional changes and by a no less substantial restructuring of the economy. Post-Soviet
Russias major political and economic institutions were formed, in their rst outlines, precisely
during these years(Kiril Rogov, 2011).6
It is worth mentioning that the beginning of this work was accompanied by political, national,
territorial and social conicts in these countries (Azerbaijan, Russia) which seriously complicated
3Vadim Volkov, Violent Entrepreneurs: The Role of Force in the Making Russian Capitalism (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornel
University Press, 2002): Timothy Colton and Stephen Holmes, eds., The State After Communism: Governance in
the New Russia (Lanham, Md., Rowman and Littleeld, 2006) ; Gerald Easter, The Russian State in the Time of
Putin,Post-Soviet A¤airs, 24, no 3 (2008), 199-230
4See chapter 5 in Gelman and Marganiya (2010).
5Joel Hellman Winners Take all: The Politics in Partial Reforms in Post-Communist Transitions, World
Politics, 50, no. 2 (1998), 203-34.
6Russia in 2020: Scenarios for the future. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Ch.7., p. 125
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the stable work of reformation of the institutional system inherited from the USSR (see Kirill
Rogov, 2011).
In the nineties of the last century, countries in review had to commence transformative actions,
and those years were also considered extremely unfavorable for the oil-producing nations. In the
late nineties oil prices dropped to a record low level (10 USD per barrel). Obviously at this junc-
ture, post-Soviet resource-rich countries could hardly expect the positive outcome of institutional
reformation. In that unstable period of time, the main headache was still a shortage of nancial
resources of the state and lack of substantial investments to the economy. As long as stability is
the leadership priority, there will be no fundamental reform of this noncompetitive industrial struc-
ture. The reform e¤orts that are commonly called modernizationwill instead focus on improving
the static e¢ ciency of the existing structure. The dilemma is that upgrading the current structure
in this way will make the more fundamental challenge of restructuring even more di¢ cult(Gaddy
and Ickes, 2011).7
However, we have to mention the role of personality, which played a colossal role in the di¢ cult
period of transformation of the post-Soviet area. In many cases institutions were created by virtue
of these personalities meeting their adequate goals and responsibilities. As it was mentioned by
Douglass North, Institutions are not . . . usually created to be socially e¢ cient; rather. . . , (they)
are created to serve the interest of those with the bargaining power to devise new rules(North,
1990). A typical example at this point can be the roles of Heydar Aliyev and Vladimir Putin in
the modern histories of Azerbaijan and Russia, respectively.
In parallel with the above, we should mention that the post-Soviet countries that are rich in
hydrocarbons and heterogeneous in the history of these resources, as well as in their traditions and
societies, also di¤er with regards to their developed institutional systems. Russia is historically
distinguished by its inadequately cumbersome and inexible bureaucracy. For example, during
the government rule of Heydar Aliyev in Azerbaijan, he undertook a sharp redundancy policy on
the state apparatus and launched a relatively small apparatus. One may assume that a rational
approach to the institutions in Azerbaijan could have led to their e¤ective existence. However, the
quality of institutions here based on the global indicators has not yet reached an adequate level.
There are also so-called institutional compromises,which in the opinion of experts are ex-
plained by the existence of the oligarchic groups in the reviewed countries with discrepant interests
(see Gelman, 2011).8 In the work Institution building and institutional trapsin Russian politics,
Vladimir Gelman comprehensively examines the Russian way of the institutional development and
arrives at the conclusion that Russia was institutionally entrapped (see Gelman, 2011, p.215). He
investigates the process of getting entrapped in detail and identies two stages, i.e. 1 the ght of
elites and cartel agreement (1993-2000) and 2 the so-called forced consensus (2000-2010). In his
work he places heavy emphasis on the problem of absence of any e¤ective institutional limitations
7Ibid., Ch.9.p.166
8Ibid., Ch.11., p.215
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in post-Soviet countries, which on the one hand is linked to the weakness of democratic institu-
tions and on the other hand to the absolute power of the executive authorities operating the large
revenues from the sale of hydrocarbons in the global markets. Absence of institutional limitations
leads to the desired institutional balance and puts a serious threat on the long-term development
of the country.
In the work Mechanisms of resource curse, economic policy and growth,Polterovich, Popov
and Tonis (2008), along with some general issues of resource curse, largely focus on institutional
aspects of resource-rich countries indicating interrelation between institutional development and
economic growth. It is unequivocally stated that poor institutions aggravate the already di¢ cult
situation in these countries and resource curse is expressed by virtue of ine¤ective management of
the revenues from the export of natural resources. As a result, economic growth slows down and
long-term country development becomes an open question.
Polterovich, Popov and Tonis (2008) distinguish three channels (macroeconomic, institutional
and technological) of resource curse.In the institutional channel, they indicate the struggle for
resource rent and instability of democracy ( p.8).
Some foreign authors pay special attention to the Central Asian countries, many of which are
rich in natural resources. The attitude of the authorities, system of public administration and par-
ticularly the established practice of undemocratic government ruling has always remained a matter
of intense interest. Incomparably large amounts of resources and their impact on the system and
methods of institutional development in the region are thoroughly examined in the work of Pauline
Jones Luong and Erika Weinthal Oil is Not a Curse.Alongside their petroleum counterparts,
these ve former Soviet republics [Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russian Federation, Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan] inherited universally weak institutions- most notably scal regimes. Their experience
suggests not only that weak institutions are not endogenous to mineral wealth but also that even
those mineral-rich states that do not inherit strong institutions can nonetheless build them. Most
importantly, the divergent development of scal regimes in each of these states from the early
1990s through 2005 also provides ample support for our contention that institutions in mineral-
rich states are not a product of their wealth per se, but rather ownership structure- that is, who
owns and controls the mineral sector(Luong and Weinthal, 2010, p.4).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in the next section, we present a macroeconomic
review of the selected countries. Section 3 presents empirical specication and data description.
Sections 4 and 5 present and analyze estimation results. Section 6 o¤ers conclusions.
2 Macroeconomic Performance and Prospects
The analysis of macroeconomic performance is largely based on information and data obtained from
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) Regional Economic Prospects
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2010-2013 and Transition Report 2010. Our analysis suggests that the key challenge for Azerbaijan,
Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan is to diversify their economies. As Porter (2004) noted,
natural resources result from endowments, not economic competitiveness. . . . countries with low
levels of productivity are more dependent on natural resource exports. Hence, relevant economic
policies (mentioned below in country overviews) to increase productivity are essential in order to
meet this aim. The main macroeconomic and vulnerability indicators are as follows:
Table 1: Main macroeconomic indicators
Countries
GDP growth (average)
(year over year percent change)
Inflation (average)
(year over year percent
change)
Fiscal
Balance
(gen. gov; %
of GDP)
GG
Debt/revenues
Current
Account
(% of GDP)
Net FDI
(% of GDP)
Forecast Forecast
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2010 2011 2012 2010 2011 2010 2011 201
0
2011 2010 2011
Azerbaijan 9.3 5.0 0.1 2.2 4.0 5.7 8.5 1.0 13.6 11.3 24.4 21.9 27.7 26.5 0.6 1.4
Russia -7.9 4.3 4.3 3.5 3.5 6.9 8.4 5.1 -3.6 0.8 33.6 31.2 4.9 5.3 -0.7 -0.8
Kazakhstan 1.2 7.3 7.5 5.0 6.0 7.1 8.4 5.2 1.5 5.8 44.6 37.8 2.9 7.6 1.5 4.5
Turkmenistan 6.1 9.2 14.7 11.1 10.0 4.8 5.8 4.5 2.3 3.6 66.0 38.6 -
11.7
2.0 18.2 12.1
Source: Regional Economic Prospects in EBRD Countries of Operations: January 2013
Table 2: Vulnerability indicators
Countries
Public and External Debt
(% of GDP)
Gross reserves Country risk Unemployment
External In percent of GDP Latest % (latest
available)
Govern
-ment
(end
2011)
Total
(end
2011)
Private
(end
2011)
Short term
(remaining
maturity)
Billions
US$
(latest)
GDP Short
term
debt
Month
of
prosp.
imports
S&P
sovereign
country
ratings
Fitch
Sovereign
country
ratings
Azerbaijan 10.0 7.3 -- -- 10.7 16.5 -- 7.2 BBB- BBB- 6.0
Russia 12.0 27.6 25.2 8.2 537.6 27.0 307.8 12.7 BBB BBB 5.4
Kazakhstan 10.5 66.5 63.5 7.4 28.3 15.0 174.5 5.1 BBB+ BBB+ 5.3
Turkmenistan 7.3 7.3 0.0 0.7 -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Source: Regional Economic Prospects in EBRD Countries of Operations: January 2013
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Azerbaijan
Limited integration into the world market insulated Azerbaijan from most of the impact of the
2008-2009 crisis (UNICEF Country Prole, 2010). The largest impact was the decline in the
cost of oil. Despite this, the Azerbaijan economy continues to grow, but at a slower rate. GDP
growth was recorded at 34.5 percent in 2006, 25 percent in 2007, 10.8 percent in 2008 and 9.3
percent in 2009 (see IMF World Economic Outlook Database, 2013). High economic growth in
2006-08 was associated with large oil exports. However, declining oil prices during the nancial
and economic crisis revealed the risks posed by high oil dependence. The crisis underlined the
economys vulnerability to uctuations in global commodity prices as the terms of trade worsened
severely. Annual growth slowed down to 0.1% in 2011, as oil and gas production reached a plateau.
Real GDP growth is forecasted to improve to 4% in 2013, but the current global economic slowdown
poses some challenges and a threat for the development of Azerbaijani economy as oil prices remain
uctuating, highlighting Azerbaijans heavy dependence on energy exports. Therefore, the key
challenge in front of Azerbaijan is to diversify its economy. To promote export diversication and
increase non-oil exports, it is crucial to improve the business environment, regional development,
encourage competition and attract more foreign investors in non-oil sectors (EBRD Transition
Report, 2010). Foreign direct investment into the non-oil sector still remains at a low level. On
the other hand, macroeconomic risks are lessened by a very strong scal position.
Russia
After su¤ering a 7.9 percent contraction in its GDP growth in 2009, Russias economy emerged
from recession with a GDP growth of 4.3 percent recorded in 2010. According to EBRD, economic
recovery has been triggered by higher oil prices, a large scal stimulus, pension increases and ample
liquidity in the banking system. GDP growth is forecasted to have reached 3.5 percent in 2012 and
expected to remain around 3.5 percent in 2013 (see EBRD Regional Economic Prospects, 2013).
However, the growth rate remains below half of the growth rate before the 2008-2009 nancial and
economic crisis.
At present, the challenge for Russia is to strengthen its scal position without putting economic
recovery at risk. This is very crucial, as the depletion of scal reserves can increase the volatility
of the economy to uctuations in global commodity prices given the fact that Russias economy
remains heavily dependent on natural resource exports (particularly, oil and gas). Therefore, to
reach a sustainable growth path, there is a great need to diversify the economy and wean the
country o¤ its excessive dependence on oil and gas revenues. This objective necessitates improving
the business environment and regional development, and proliferating FDI friendly policies.
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Kazakhstan
In response to global economic slowdown, economic growth in Kazakhstan has decelerated. GDP
growth was recorded at 8.9 percent in 2007, 3.2 percent in 2008 and 1.2 percent in 2009 (see IMF
World Economic Outlook Database, 2013). The Kazakhstan economy emerged from recession in
the end of 2009 driven by extractive industries, and the GDP expanded by 7.3 percent in 2010.
GDP growth is forecasted to have slowed down from 7.5 percent in 2011 to 5 percent in 2012, and
expected to improve to 6 percent in 2013 due to a new phase of the Kashagan o¤shore oil eld
(EBRD Regional Economic Prospects, 2013). Growth is supported by high commodity prices and
scal stimulus.
In order to reach a long-term sustainable growth path, the key challenge before Kazakhstan is
to diversify the economy and modernize industry and service sectors. To meet this aim, more state
investment in infrastructure, education, and industrial projects as well as the active involvement
of the private sector are required (EBRD Transition Report, 2010).
Turkmenistan
Turkmenistan remains the least reformed of all transition countries and has only started the
process of transition in the last two years(EBRD Transition Report, 2010). Turkmenistan has
limited integration with world markets. Due to its dependence on hydrocarbons, Turkmenistan
has not been considerably a¤ected by the 2008-2009 nancial and economic crisis. GDP growth
moderated from 10 percent in 2008 (14.8 percent according to IMF) to 6.1 percent in 2009, rose
by 14.7 percent in 2011 (due to increased gas exports to Iran and China), and is forecast to reach
10 percent in 2013. However, it is assumed that the economy will remain strong in the medium
term, supported by abundant gas reserves.
Therefore, key challenges are to wean the country o¤ its excessive dependence on natural
resources and modernize its industry. These objectives necessitate attracting private sector in-
vestment. In Turkmenistan, access of small and medium sized enterprises to nance is di¢ cult as
state dominance in the nancial system remains large. Therefore, attracting private banks could
improve liquidity and e¢ ciency in the banking sector.
3 Empirical Specication and Data Description
Using a panel dataset containing information on government e¤ectiveness, we establish the deter-
minants of government e¤ectiveness in Azerbaijan, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan over
the period 1996 to 2011. The multiple linear regression models to be estimated are as follows:
GovEfit = 1OilRent it + 2GDPpcit + 3Z + ni + rt + eit (1)
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Government e¤ectiveness, denoted by GovEf , reects perceptions of the quality of public
services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures,
the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the governments
commitment to such policies (World Bank). The variable of interest is OilRent (oil rents as a
percentage of GDP), which measures the di¤erence between the value of crude oil production at
world prices and total costs of production. GDP per capita, denoted by GDPpc, is a proxy for
the stage of development. It is assumed that the institutional quality is associated with the stage
of development of each country. n is a country xed e¤ect, r is a time xed e¤ect and e is an error
term. The other control variables that are assumed to inuence government e¤ectiveness are given
in Z matrix. These control variables include Polity IV and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) stock
as a percent of GDP.
Polity IV is a politics index on political freedom, an indicator of democracy. The data on the
politics index is taken from the Polity IV Project supported by the Political Instability Task Force,
Societal-Systems Research, and Center for Systemic Peace. The indicator for democracy is the
ranking based on the Polity score for the level of democracy, ranging from -10 (strongly autocratic)
to 10+ (strongly democratic).
It is assumed that the positive externality in institutional quality is captured by the spillovers
from FDI. These spillovers include not only information on technologies, but also management
methods brought through foreign direct investment. The spillovers are also the determinants
of the growth rate of human capital, which has an indispensable role in institutional quality.9
The reason for considering FDI stock instead of FDI inows is that technological and knowledge
spillovers are captured from stock variables. Therefore, in our opinion, an increase in oil revenues is
highly associated with foreign investment in oil sector. On the other hand, the literature suggests
that the quality of government infrastructure is an important determinant of FDI inows (see
Kirkpatrick, Parker and Zhang, 2006; Globerman, Shapiro, 2002; Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann,
2000). Considering causality, private foreign investment in infrastructure can have a positive
inuence on the quality of regulatory framework. Attracting a wider, more diverse set of FDI rms
is critical to the broader strategic framework of ghting state capture and corruption(Hellman,
Jones, and Kaufmann, 2002).
In addition to the abovementioned static econometric model, which represents the response
of government e¤ectiveness to current events, we also resort to a distributed-lag model using the
lagged variable of oil rents as a percent of GDP to incorporate feedback over time. We predict that
measuring the inuence of oil rents with a time lag on government e¤ectiveness can improve the
9An increase in human capital through technology spillovers from abroad is captured by instruction, education
and training of employees to meet the higher standards. More precisely, multinational corporations (MNCs) in the
host economy increase the degree of competition and force existing rms (including the ine¢ cient ones) to make
themselves more productive by investing in human capital (see Magnus Blomström, 1991). "MNCs also provide
the training of labor and management which may then become available to the economy in general" (Magnus
Blomström, 1991).
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signicance of its coe¢ cient. It is worthwhile to note that while creating oil rents (% of GDP)
lagged one yearwe will have T-1 year observations for each country, where T = 16.
Since the years for which data are available di¤er, the estimates are done for an unbalanced
panel. There is a lack of data for government e¤ectiveness in 1997, 1999, and 2001 in each country.
On the other hand, oil rents and total natural resources rents (% of GDP) are not available in 2011.
Hence, the observations of 16 years in our sample are reduced to 12 years for each country. Data on
government e¤ectiveness, oil rents and total natural resources rents (% of GDP) are obtained from
the World Bank. Data on GDP per capita and FDI stock are obtained from the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and International Monetary Fund (IMF), respectively.
In order to estimate parameters from the panel data set, we resort to the methods of xed
e¤ects and random e¤ects. The choice between the two estimation methods will be discussed in
the next section.
4 Estimation Results
Before delving into the discussions of estimation results, we analyze the partial correlation between
government e¤ectiveness and oil revenues visually. Partial correlation measures the degree of
association between the two variables, with the e¤ect of a set of controlling variables excluded.
Therefore, we resort to scatter plots for Azerbaijan, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan given
as below.
Figure 1: Government e¤ectiveness versus oil rents, aggregate (partial relation).
-1
.5
-1
-.5
0
0 20 40 60
Oil rents (% of GDP)
Government Effectiveness Fitted values
Source: The World Bank, the Worldwide Governance Indicators (1996-2011)
According to the aggregate scatter plot, government e¤ectiveness is associated negatively with
oil rents (% of GDP). But the correlation (-0.1804) is not statistically signicant. Thus, we do
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not get clear evidence from the cross-national sample. The graph suggests that the estimated
relationship is driven by outlier observations and has clear departures from linearity. To clarify
this relationship, we depict country-specic e¤ects in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Government e¤ectiveness versus oil rents (partial relation).
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The negativity has been caused by the negative correlation of government e¤ectiveness and
oil revenues in Turkmenistan, whereas the data of both variables from Azerbaijan, Russia, and
Kazakhstan have exhibited positive correlation. A negative tendency in Russia has been observed
over the period 2002 to 2006, and a positive tendency has been observed starting from 2006.
Although data for government e¤ectiveness in 2001 is missing, we can judge that the negativity
overlaps with the government change in Russia (2000 2008). The scatter plot for the total natural
resources rents suggests that, in aggregate, revenues on total natural resources have a negative
impact on government e¤ectiveness as depicted in Figure 3:
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Figure 3: Government e¤ectiveness versus total natural resources rents, aggregate (partial rela-
tion).
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Source: The World Bank, the Worldwide Governance Indicators (1996-2011)
There is statistically signicant correlation (-0.7318) at 5%. It is worthwhile to note that this
negativity has been caused by the negative correlation of both variables in Russia and Turkmenistan
as depicted in Figure 4.
It seems that Turkmenistans case is di¤erent from the cases of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan,
where oil revenues and total natural revenues exert negative inuence on government e¤ectiveness.
As to the case of Russia, we assume that the negative tendency in government e¤ectiveness has been
caused by natural gas rents. The scatter plot for the correlation of government e¤ectiveness
and natural gas rents (% of GDP) in Russia is depicted in Figure 5:
Our visual analysis of government e¤ectiveness and resource revenues suggests that we should
control for country specic e¤ects. To justify this, we turn to econometric analysis to decide
between two estimation methods: xed e¤ects and random e¤ects. Initially, we run a Hausman test
where the null hypothesis is that the preferred model is random a¤ects versus the alternative the
xed e¤ects. It basically tests whether the unique errors (ei) are correlated with the repressors (the
null hypothesis is that they are not correlated). When the Hausman test rejects xed e¤ects and
accepts random e¤ects, we run Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier (LM) test for random
e¤ects model. LM test helps us decide between a random e¤ects regression and a simple OLS
regression. The null hypothesis is that variances across entities are zero. That is, there is no
evidence of signicant di¤erences across countries. Therefore, to overcome this dilemma, we report
the results of both estimation approaches in Tables 3-4.
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Figure 4: Government e¤ectiveness versus total natural resources rents (partial relation).
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Figure 5: Government e¤ectiveness versus natural gas rents, Russia (partial relation).
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Table 3: Government e¤ectiveness as a dependent variable - unbalanced panel
FE (1) FE (2) FE (3) FE (4) RE (1) RE (2) RE (3) RE (4) OLS
Oil rents (% of
GDP)
.0051
(1.70)*
.0048
(1.63)
Oil rents (% of
GDP, lag)
.0081
(2.66)**
.0037
(1.07)
.0036
(1.03)
.0078
(2.58)***
.01086
(2.70)***
.01378
(3.73)***
.0137783
(3.73)***
GDP per capita .0933
(2.70)**
.0991
(2.70)**
1.0858
(11.26)***
.8637
(7.67)***
.8637035
(7.67)***
FDI stock (% of
GDP, lag)
.1794
(1.77)*
.1878
(1.81)*
.9313
(6.51)***
.9483
(7.47)***
.9482503
(7.47)***
Politics .01646
(0.51)
.0280
(3.03)***
.0280465
(3.03)***
Observations 48 44 44 44 48 44 44 44 44
Prob> F 0.0114 0.0020 0.0050 0.1027 0.0098 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Hausman Test 0.5924 0.4684 0.0165 0.0000
Breusch& Pagan 0.0000 0.0000 0.0293 0.8353
t statistics in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
P values for Hausman and Breusch& Pagan tests are given. The null hypothesis is rejected for p-value smaller than 10%.
Time dummies have been included in RE (3), and RE (4) based on the tests for time dummies.
Table 4: Government e¤ectiveness as a dependent variable.
FE (1) FE (2) FE (3) FE (4) RE (1) RE (2) RE (3) RE (4) OLS
Total Natural
Resource rents
(% of GDP)
.00001
(0.02)
-.0049
(-5.42)***
Total Natural
Resource rents
(% of GDP, lag)
-.00002
(-0.02)
-.0008
(-0.96)
-.0008
(-0.99)
-.0061
(-
6.55)***
-.0049
(-4.09)***
-.0045
(-3.73)***
-.0045
(-3.73)***
GDP per capita .1213
(4.11)**
*
.1281
(4.05)***
.4752
(3.66)***
.4011
(2.82)**
.4011
(2.82)***
FDI stock (% of
GDP, lag)
.1592
(1.57)
.1695
(1.64)
.4068
(2.14)**
.4597
(2.38)**
.4597
(2.38)**
Politics .0202
(0.63)
.0111
(1.21)
.0111
(1.21)
Observations 48 44 44 44 48 44 44 44 44
Prob> F 0.9876 0.9829 0.0022 0.0052 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Hausman Test -- 0.0000 0.0119 0.0649
Breusch& Pagan 0.0033 0.0480 0.4677 0.6894
t statistics in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
P values for Hausman and Breusch & Pagan tests are given. The null hypothesis is rejected for p-value smaller than 10%.
Time dummies have been included RE (3), and RE (4) based on the tests for time dummies.
Our ndings suggest that oil rents (% of GDP) exert positive impact on government e¤ec-
tiveness in both estimation approaches. In contrast, total natural resources rents (% of GDP) are
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negatively associated with government e¤ectiveness. It should be no surprise that this negativity
has been generated by the data of Russia and Turkmenistan. We obtain statistically signicant
coe¢ cients while using random e¤ects estimations and the results are robust. By robustness we
mean that no matter if any of the other explanatory variables are excluded from the main equation,
the explanatory variable still keeps its sign and signicant level.
In both estimations, we do not nd any reliable evidence on the impact of political stability
on government e¤ectiveness. It should be noted that only Russia has a positive polity IV score
of 6 (close to democracy), which has decreased to 4 starting from 2007. The other countries
in our sample have kept the negative sign as constant: Azerbaijan (-7), Kazakhstan (-6), and
Turkmenistan (-9). Therefore, the impact of democracy proxied by polity IV is ambiguous.
We also nd clear evidence on the impact of GDP per capita and FDI stock. The results
suggest that an increase in economic development and the realization of spillovers through foreign
investment are highly associated with the e¤ectiveness of the government.
Once we have found the association between government e¤ectiveness and resource rents using
panel data analysis, we can rank the countries in terms of government e¤ectiveness (see Figure 6).
Figure 6: Country rankings in terms of government e¤ectiveness.
Source: The World Bank, the Worldwide Governance Indicators (1996-2011)
As shown through the scatter plots (Figure 6), countries with higher average oil rents (% of
GDP) and total natural resource rents (% of GDP) have lower rates of government e¤ectiveness. In
ranking from high to low government e¤ectiveness, the countries can be classied as follows: Russia,
Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. It indicates that, in general, a negative association is
present. However, based on our analysis of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Russia, we can predict
that this negativity in the region will shift to a positive tendency in the future.
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5 Discussion
Institutions are among the main sustainable growth and development determinants in post-Soviet
resource-rich countries. The main evidence of this study is that the impact of the main resource-
related indicators on institutional quality is negative. The one exception is Russia, where oil
rents impacted the quality of institutions positively while the impact of total natural resources
on institutional quality is slightly negative. As we can see from Figure 1 (which shows trends of
oil-gas rents as percentage in GDP), natural gas rents also play a crucial role in the total resource
dependence of Russia despite its declining trend. Excluding Turkmenistan, in other resource-rich
post-Soviet countries, the weight of oil rents in GDP exceed the ratio of natural gas rents in GDP.
Figure 7: Dynamics of oil and gas rents in resource-rich CIS countries.
Source: WB Metadata, authorscalculations
Aidis and Estrin (2006) revealed that after a catastrophic period of macro-economic perfor-
mance immediately subsequent to transition, the Russian economy had begun to recover during the
mid-1990s and subsequent increases in the price of oil and other raw materials inaugurated a long
period of relatively fast growth in Russia, from 1999, which has been maintained until this day
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(2006). High energy prices have helped stabilize resource-rich post-Soviet countries (Russia, Kaza-
khstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan  Geo-economic heartland) internally and temporarily.
But in the long run, hazardous dependence on natural resources led to negative consequences and
challenges for these countries including improper functioning of a bureaucracy and state failure. In
the Failed States Indexfor 2012, these four countries are under a high warningthat they may
fall into the failed states group.10 State legitimacy(corruption, government e¤ectiveness, polit-
ical participation, electoral process, level of democracy, illicit economy, power struggles, etc.) is
especially considered problematic; the fact has been stated that in this country group corruption
and a lack of representativeness in the government directly undermine the social contract.
The Bertelsmann Stiftungs Transformation Index (BTI) is the cross-national comparative in-
dex that uses self-collected data to measure the quality of governance and provide a comprehensive
analysis of countriespolicymaking success during processes of transition. BTI 2012 identied that
stability of democratic institutions, rule of law, property rights, political participation and inte-
gration can be characterized as breakable in resource-rich post-Soviet countries. In accordance
with BTI 2012, democratic institutions exist on paper and function well but within the frame-
work of a semi-authoritarian regime in Azerbaijan,no functioning democratic institutions exist
in Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstans regime continues to be authoritarian rather than demo-
cratic, and the review period conrmed the country on this authoritarian path.Only in Russia
the democratic institutions foreseen in the constitution do all exist and perform their function in
principle.11
10http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/library/cfsir1210-failedstatesindex2012-06p.pdf
11http://www.bti-project.org/country-reports/pse/
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Figure 8: Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2012.
Source: http://www.bti-project.org
Index of Economic Freedom also emphasized the role of e¤ective institutions in development
and ensuring economic freedom. It has identied four broad categories of economic freedom:
Index of Economic Freedom also emphasized the role of e¤ective institutions in development
and ensuring economic freedom. It has identied four broad categories of economic freedom:
(i) Rule of law (property rights, freedom from corruption);
(ii) Limited government (scal freedom, government spending);
(iii) Regulatory e¢ ciency (business freedom, labor freedom, monetary freedom);
(iv) Open markets (trade freedom, investment freedom, and nancial freedom).
Due to Index of Economic Freedom 2012, substantial challenges remain, particularly in imple-
menting deeper institutional and systemic reforms that are critical to strengthening the foundations
of economic freedom in Azerbaijan. Institutional shortcomings such as a weak judicial system and
widespread corruption hold down diversication and modernization in Kazakhstan. The Russian
government has demonstrated little if any commitment to economic reform in recent years and
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strong returns from hydrocarbons have buoyed the economy, prospects for sustained long-term
growth and diversication remain dim. In Turkmenistan, vibrant economic growth is severely
constrained by long-standing institutional weaknesses that undermine the foundations of economic
freedom and heavy state involvement in the leading economic sectors has dampened private-sector
dynamism and has led to economic stagnation in non-hydrocarbon sectors.12
Taking into accounts that the main source of public nance in these countries is exhaustible
oil-gas revenues, the quality of budgetary oversight institutions is very crucial. Certain rules
and procedures govern these institutions integration into the decision-making process, such as
the necessity for a budget debate in the parliament and parliament budgetary approval. But
Open Budget Survey (OBS) (as the only independent, comparative, regular measure of budget
transparency and accountability around the world) also distinguished the capacity of oversight
institutions in Russia from other countries in the region in a positive manner. According to the
Open Budget Survey 2010, the budget oversight provided by Russias legislature is generally strong,
but it does not allow the public to be present during legislative hearings at which the executive
testies on its proposed budget. Budget oversight provided by Russias supreme audit institution
(SAI) also is generally strong, but it does not have adequate reporting on the follow-up steps taken
by the executive to address audit recommendations. Budget oversight provided by Kazakhstans
legislature and SAI are inadequate because it does not hold open budget discussions at which the
public can testify and because it is not fully independent from the executive. Budget oversight
provided by Azerbaijans legislature is inadequate because it does not have full power to amend
the budget proposal. Oversight provided by Azerbaijans SAI is weak due to the lack of complete
discretion in law to choose what to audit and lack of su¢ cient resources to meaningfully exercise
its mandate.13 This is also a valid argument that under-developed state capacities increased the
incentives for states to capture more rents and oil-gas nationalization (see Ahrend and Tompson,
2006).
Due to BTI 2012 rising revenues from the export of oil and gas provide the economic potential
for transformation.Generally, it is a straightforward supposition that oil-gas rents will lead to
weak institutional quality, if they do not lead to a positive determinant for drastic reforms at the
same time. A great deal of empirical evidence in the existing literature on the relationship between
oil-gas rents and changes in institutional quality nds no indubitable statistical causality between
the two. But we found that total natural resources rents as a percentage in GDP in four resource-
rich post-Soviet countries have a negative relationship with government e¤ectiveness.14 Our study
provides the framework for future studies to assess the quality of institutions in resource-rich
12http://www.heritage.org/index/pdf/2012/book/index_2012.pdf
13http://internationalbudget.org/what-we-do/open-budget-survey/country-info/
14World Bank denes oil rentsas the di¤erence between the value of crude oil production at world prices and
total costs of production, natural gas rentsas the di¤erence between the value of natural gas production at world
prices and total costs of production, and total natural resources rentsas the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents,
coal rents, mineral rents, and forest rents.
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countries.
6 Conclusion
This paper presents a comprehensive assessment of the linkage between institutional quality and
resource dependence in resource-rich transition countries of the Caspian basin particularly Azer-
baijan, Kazakhstan, Russia and Turkmenistan. Drawing on multiple sources, the paper assembles
a comprehensive set of information to date pertaining to the institutional quality for diverse coun-
tries of this region, both in terms of country background and levels of economic development.
Also, using a panel dataset containing information on government e¤ectiveness, we establish the
determinants of government e¤ectiveness in Azerbaijan, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan
over the period of 1996 to 2011. A two-way causal link between the two is also well-recognized
in the existing literature. The various combinations of variables were compared experimentally.
Once we found the association between government e¤ectiveness and resource rents using panel
data analysis, then we could rank the countries in terms of government e¤ectiveness. The analysis
for the total natural resource rents suggests that, in aggregate, revenues on total natural resources
have a negative impact on government e¤ectiveness. The countries with higher average oil rents (%
of GDP) and total natural resource rents (% of GDP) have lower rates of government e¤ectiveness.
This nding is promising and should be explored with other resource-rich countries. Our results are
encouraging and should be validated in a larger set of relevant data which directly and indirectly
relates to quality of governance and government e¤ectiveness. These results provide compelling
evidence that there is a direct undue inuence among variables related to resource abundance
and institutional quality. An applied approach in this study can be used in the identication of
institutional aspects of the resource curseconcept. Our study provides the framework for future
studies to assess the quality of institutions in resource-rich countries, but has also raised some se-
rious questions. One of the important questions for future studies is to dene the mutual inuence
channels between institutional quality and natural resource dependence using multidimensional
variables.
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